Projected Impacts of U.S. Immigration on Per Capita Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 2050 and 2100 by Pitkin, J.
Projected Impacts of U.S. 
Immigration on Per Capita 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 2050 
and 2100
Pitkin, J.
IIASA Interim Report
March 2007
 
Pitkin, J. (2007) Projected Impacts of U.S. Immigration on Per Capita Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 2050 and 2100. IIASA 
Interim Report. IR-07-006 Copyright © 2007 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/8449/ 
Interim Report on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
i International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis  
Registration number: ZVR 524808900 
 
 
International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis 
Schlossplatz 1 
A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria 
Tel: +43 2236 807 342 
Fax: +43 2236 71313 
E-mail: publications@iiasa.ac.at 
Web: www.iiasa.ac.at 
 
 
Interim Reports on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only 
limited review. Views or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the 
Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other organizations supporting the work. 
Interim Report IR-07-006 
Projected Impacts of U.S. Immigration on Per Capita  
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 2050 and 2100 
 
John Pitkin (john_pitkin@earthlink.net)  
 
Approved by 
Brian O’Neill (oneill@iiasa.ac.at) 
Leader, Population and Climate Change Program 
March 7, 2007 
 
 
 ii 
Contents 
Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1 
Population Heterogeneity by Nativity .............................................................................. 2 
Variations by Ethnicity in Earnings and Consumption ................................................ 2 
Data and Definitions..................................................................................................... 3 
Variations in Earnings by Nativity and Immigrant Generation.................................... 5 
Gaps and Intergenerational Gains in Per Capita Hispanic Earnings ................................ 8 
1st Generation Gaps ...................................................................................................... 8 
Gaps in the 2nd and Later Generations.......................................................................... 9 
Projections of Population by Ethnicity, Nativity, and Immigrant Generation ............... 11 
Population or Household Base ....................................................................................... 14 
Projected Effects on Average Per Capita Earnings ........................................................ 14 
Conclusions .................................................................................................................... 15 
References ...................................................................................................................... 16 
 
 iii
Abstract 
Immigration affects long-run projections of U.S. CO2 emissions, via the impacts on 
population scale, population aging, and labor supply.  This article estimates the labor 
supply effects, complementing an earlier paper in which the authors have modeled the 
effects of scale and aging.  Labor supply effects on future CO2 emissions are 
approximated based on recent survey data on earnings differences between immigrant 
and native-born households and on existing demographic projections.  Gaps in average 
earnings are found to be substantial only for Hispanic immigrants, between 25 and 47 
percent below native-born peers, depending on the age group and measure used.  
Impacts are estimated using a range of population projections and assumptions about 
future convergence, or assimilation, of the earnings of immigrants and their descendents 
to those of the descendents of the native-born population.  If per capita earnings 
differences remain near current levels, the aggregate effects on per capita earnings and 
consumption are found to be affected more by the rate at which the immigrant 
population’s earnings converge to native-born levels than by projected differences in 
future immigration.  If assimilation is rapid, the impacts of immigration are proportional 
to the size of the first generation and negligible, regardless of the level of immigration.  
If future assimilation is impeded, the marginal impacts will be more substantial and vary 
with the level of immigration but still well below 10% in 2100 when calculated using 
the preferred measure of earning differences and only exceed 10% when the impacts are 
calculated using the alternate per capita earnings differences.  
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Introduction 
In a recent paper (Dalton, O’Neill, Prskawetz, Jiang, and Pitkin, 2006) we found that 
taking account of population aging reduces projected per capita emissions of carbon 
dioxide (the most important greenhouse gas) in the U.S. at the end of the century by as 
much as 40 percent.  This result, from an energy-economic growth model, results from 
shifts in the age composition of the population, or “population aging.”   Older households 
supply less labor and have different patterns of consumption than younger households.  
This report describes our findings on how projected greenhouse gas emissions are 
affected by the level of immigration. 
The bulk of the effects of international migration are incorporated, either 
explicitly or implicitly, in the three population scenarios in the Dalton, et. al. paper, 
which are detailed in Jiang and O’Neill (submitted).  These effects include those of 
population size or scale, which are explicitly reflected in the alternative population 
scenarios.  “Population size varies among the three scenarios by more than a factor of 
four in 2100, driven by differences in assumptions about fertility, mortality, and 
international migration.”1  The impacts of immigration on the household structure of the 
population, by contrast, are modeled implicitly, via (1) the assumed age structure of new 
immigrants (modal age 20-24) and (2) the combinations of demographic rates assumed in 
the different scenarios.  The low population scenario couples low immigration with low 
fertility and projects smaller, older households than the other scenarios; the high 
population scenario couples high immigration with high fertility and results in larger, 
younger households than other scenarios; and the middle scenario is intermediate 
between these.  By combining low immigration with lower fertility and high immigration 
with higher fertility, the scenarios implicitly reflect the effects of higher fertility rates 
among foreign-born than native-born women.2   
The three population scenarios thus approximately indicate the effects of different 
levels of immigration on the size and age composition of the population and, in turn, on 
future greenhouse gas emissions.  However they do not reflect the potential effects of 
differences in average earnings between foreign-born and native-born workers.  These 
                                                 
1
 (“…because the U.S. is one of the world's major migration destination countries, immigration 
assumptions play a particularly important role in future population outcomes.”)     
2
 Explicit and precise would be better. 
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gaps, which are believed to reflect differences in productivity or efficiency rather than the 
effects of discrimination, indicate that there is immigration-related heterogeneity in the 
population that is not reflected by the energy-economic model.  These differences in 
labor productivity are potentially important, since Dalton et al. found that the aging effect 
on emissions acted primarily through changes in labor supply that affected the economic 
growth rate and hence emissions.  
The likely immigration-related labor supply effects on the model’s projections of 
carbon emissions are the primary focus of this report.  Performing a full PET model 
analysis would require substantial new work on household projections, model 
development, and data analysis.  Our aim is therefore to make a rough estimate of the 
likely effects based on economic data describing differences between immigrant and 
native-born households, and existing demographic projections. These results could then 
be used as a basis for deciding whether further analysis is warranted. The plan of the 
report is first to describe the current (2000-2005) data on differences by nativity in the 
model’s key demographic and economic inputs and next to consider the range of theories 
about the speed at which the foreign-born rates will converge, or assimilate, to the native-
born rates.  In order to assess the implication of these differences and theories for 
projected carbon emissions, it is necessary to quantify the nativity composition of the 
population (foreign-born and their descendents), so the report then describes available 
long-term projections of the U.S. population by nativity.  Based on these projections, the 
report then proposes an operational measure of the “immigrant composition” effect on 
emissions and calculates upper bounds on its size for the different model scenarios. 
Population Heterogeneity by Nativity 
Variations by Ethnicity in Earnings and Consumption  
No information on nativity is available in the Consumer Expenditure Survey data (CES) 
that were used to calibrate the variations of consumption, labor income, savings, assets, 
and transfer and capital income across household types in the PET model.  The best 
measures of differences in these variables by nativity status are obtained by using 
Hispanic origin of householder as a proxy indicator: 62.7 % of the population that is 
living in households with Hispanic householders live in households where the 
householder is foreign born (Current Population Survey March Supplement (CPS) 2003-
2005, mean), almost quadruple the 16.4 % of the total population that lives with foreign 
born householders.  Although the comparable fraction of persons in households with 
Asian or Pacific Islander (Asian) householders is even higher, 79.6 %, we focus on 
Hispanic householders because, as will be seen below, the gaps in labor income and other 
variables are much larger for Hispanic immigrants than for those of other ethnicity. 
The percentage differences, or gaps, between the population in Hispanic 
households (where the householder is of Hispanic origin) and the population in all 
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households, are shown in the bottom panel of Table 1.3  In this and the following tables 
the sample universe is persons, not households, giving a greater weight to large 
households.  The gaps fall into two distinct ranges for the different variables, (1) for 
consumption, labor income, and, average government transfers above age 64 they are 34 
– 36%, and (2) for savings, capital income, and capital assets they range from 63 to 72%.  
(The latter range extends to 87% if the minor “other household transfer” category is 
included.) 
The near equality of the gaps in labor income and consumption is no coincidence.  
There is a strong behavioral connection between earnings and consumption rooted in the 
high proportion of pre-retirement total income that is comprised by earnings and the 
constraint placed by total income on consumption.  Barring large differences in savings 
rates, the gaps in earnings and consumption are necessarily similar.  A similar if slightly 
less mechanical connection can be made between labor income below retirement age and 
government transfers above retirement age, since a substantial share of the latter consist 
of Social Security and pensions that are based in part on pre-retirement earnings.  
Because of these relationships, differences between nativity and ethnic groups in labor 
income, or earnings, are a valid proxy measure of inter-group differences in consumption.  
This correspondence will allow us to use other surveys that include good information on 
earnings to measure more precisely the differences in earnings and consumption between 
foreign and native-born householders. 
There is a similar correlation between the size of the gaps in savings, capital, and 
capital income.  However, the absence of reliable data on any of these three variables in 
surveys that also include nativity makes it impossible to investigate the effects of nativity 
status on savings behavior and asset holdings.  Exploratory investigations of CPS data 
suggest that low level of capital income (dividends, interest, and rents) for Hispanics is 
only in part an immigration effect that is narrowed in the second and later generations.  
However, the reliability of these data is questionable, as is shown below. 
Data and Definitions 
As a basis for investigating the effects of nativity on labor income, or earnings, and 
consumption, we use the Current Population Survey March Annual Demographic 
Supplement (CPS), which includes information on place of birth (U.S. or foreign born), 
year of arrival in the U.S. (if foreign born), and the nativity of each parent (foreign or 
native born).   
Although the CPS does not have information on expenditures, it includes 
information on earnings, asset income (interest, dividends, and rents) and housing tenure 
(owner or renter occupier).  In addition to these variables which directly or indirectly 
enter the household sector of the PET model, we also consider household size, which is 
significant both as a determinant of per capita labor inputs and consumption.  These data 
are supplemented by independent information on house value of owner-occupied houses, 
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 This table has the same categories as Table 2 in Dalton et. al. (2006) but the data are more current here, 
2004 instead of 1998. 
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which are a large component of household assets, from the 2000 Census (5% Public Use 
Microdata Sample, or PUMS). 
In order to reduce sampling variance for small population strata, we pool the CPS 
samples for March 2003, 2004, and 2005.4   
Are the CPS data consistent enough with the CES used to estimate the PET model 
that inferences drawn from the CPS can be assumed to apply to a model calibrated to the 
CES?  To answer this question, we compare the sample means in the two datasets.  The 
means are stratified by age, to control for the variability of earnings over the life course, 
and by race and Spanish origin5, because of the high concentration of foreign-born 
population in Hispanic and Asian households. 
The mean values of the model inputs in the different age and race groups are 
shown in the top part of Table 2.  While average household size, average earnings per 
capita, and home ownership rate vary substantially among the population groups, the CPS 
means closely match the CES data, stratum by stratum, as seen in the percentage 
differences between the two estimates for these variables, shown in the lower panel of 
Table 2.  For these three key variables, the two surveys are in close agreement.  It is 
reasonable to infer that nativity effects measured in the CPS data on these variables are 
comparable to the CES.   
By contrast, there are large (>100%) differences in asset income between the two 
surveys and lesser but still substantial differences in house values between the CES and 
the 2000 Census.  This suggests that the coverage of asset income and the definition of 
house value differ between the two surveys.  The impact of these differences on nativity 
effects is unclear. 
Since assimilation is oftern not completed within the life of the first generation it 
will be impotant also to consider differences between the descendents of recent 
immigrants and the descents of native-born parentage.  By combining information on 
place of birth and parents’ nativity, we can further stratify the population into three 
nativity-generation classes for which measures of earnings can are available: 
1. Foreign born (first immigrant generation), 
2. Native born with one or two foreign-born parents (second immigrant generation), 
and 
3. Native born with two native-born parents (third or higher immigrant generation). 
 
According to the generally used definition of second generation as including people with 
one or two foreign-born parents there are 2.13 million Hispanic householders in the 2nd 
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 A total of 640,313 persons in 231,754 households. 
5
 The race/origin categorization is Spanish-dominant: all persons of Spanish origin regardless of race are 
classified as Hispanic.  The CPS allows persons to be coded as being of multiple races.  The population 
living with non-Hispanic householders coded as being of more than one race were excluded from the 
tabulations presented here except those in which the householder is of exactly two races one of which is 
Native American, in which case the other race category is used: 99.1 % of the total CPS population is 
included in the resulting tabulations. 
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generation.  (Table 3.)  As the result of exogamy, i.e., unions between foreign and native-
born, 40 % of these have just one foreign-born parent.  Thus an expansive definition 
considerably increases the size of the 2nd generation.  At the same time, the broad 
definition tends to raise the mean household earnings per person of the 2nd generation, 
which is substantially higher (by 11 %) for householders with just one foreign-born 
parent than for those with two.   
The total populations in these households, the population measure employed in 
the PET model, are shown in the second column of Table 3.  It should be noted that mean 
household size is substantially larger for 1st generation households, 3.5 persons, than 2nd 
generation households (3.1 and 2.9 persons, respectively, for two and one foreign-born 
parents).  These differences in household size are a consequence mainly of differences in 
fertility rates and the number of minor children.   
Which definition is used to determine nativity and generational status greatly 
affects the populations and mean per-person earnings in the different categories.  As can 
be seen from the third column in Table 3, the 1st generation Hispanic population is 7.4 
million (30 %) smaller than the population living in households in which the householder 
is 1st generation Hispanic or “1st generation Hispanic households,” and the 2nd and 3rd-
plus generation populations are correspondingly greater than the populations in the 2nd 
and 3rd-plus generation households.  As a rule, parents have children of higher-order 
nativity than they are, the one exception being native-born parents with foreign-born 
partners.  Thus the generational distribution of persons according to own status is skewed 
upward relative to the distribution according to householders’ status.   
Choice of reference person even affects population ethnicity; 1.3 million more 
persons (3.5 %) are identified as Hispanic than there are people living in Hispanic 
households (with a Hispanic householder). 
Table 3 also shows populations and households for non-Hispanic households and 
population. 
Henceforward in this report, the following conventions are used unless otherwise 
noted: 
1. 2nd generation is defined has having one or two parents who are foreign born; and 
2. the population is stratified according to the characteristics of the householder with 
whom each person lives.6  
Variations in Earnings by Nativity and Immigrant Generation 
When nativity and immigrant generation as well as controls on householder’s age are 
added to the analysis, we find that there are large gaps between the mean per person pre-
retirement earnings in foreign-born Hispanic households, those in native-born Hispanic 
households and those in non-Hispanic households whether native or foreign-born.  (See 
top two charts in Figure 1 and Table 4).  For those living in households where the 
householder is under age 45, the mean earnings in foreign-born households are below 
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 Own characteristics are used for the small number of CPS persons living in group quarters. 
 6 
those in native-born 3rd-plus generation Hispanic households by 27 %, in native-born 3rd-
plus generation non-Hispanic households by 49 %, and in foreign-born non-Hispanic 
households by 52 %.  Similar gaps are seen in the next older age group, householder age 
45 to 64 years. 
From this we conclude that large nativity effects occur only for Hispanic 
households.  In fact, we see that below age 45 in non-Hispanic households, mean per 
capita income in foreign-born households is slightly higher in foreign than native-born 
households.  Because nativity effects are small on average in non-Hispanic households, 
our analysis of nativity effects on consumption and carbon emissions focuses on Hispanic 
households and combines non-Hispanic immigrants of different races.7   
There is also a clear tendency for relative earnings to rise with longer residence in 
the U.S.  These gains are modest during the first generation, e.g., mean earnings are only 
marginally higher when recent arrivals, who have been in the U.S. under 10 years, are 
excluded.  (Second pair of bars in Figure 1.)   Much stronger gains are seen between the 
1st and 2nd immigrant generations, e.g., mean income in 2nd generation Hispanic 
households under age 45 is 30 % below that for 3rd-plus generation non-Hispanics, 
compared with 49 % between foreign-born Hispanic households and the same reference 
group.  Among Hispanics this convergence toward the earnings of 3rd-plus generation 
non-Hispanic peers continues between the 2nd and 3rd-plus generations and can be 
described as assimilation.   
(Among non-Hispanics, the relative gains in earnings are as strong between the 
first and 2nd immigrant generations as they are for Hispanics, however, they cannot 
accurately be described as assimilation, because the mean income exceeds and is 
therefore rising substantially above that in 3rd-plus generation.) 
The convergence of Hispanic mean earnings toward the population or non-
Hispanic native-born means is far from complete by the 3rd generation, however, leaving 
an earnings gap of 20 % or more for both the under 45 and age 45 to 64 households.  This 
would seem to indicate that gains among Hispanic households reach a plateau and even 
halt after the 3rd generation.  However two other possible explanations might account for 
this finding.  (1) It possible that there are substantial gains after the third generation and 
the large share of 3rd generation Hispanics drags down the mean among the combined 3rd-
plus generation group.  The CPS data lack the information needed to distinguish the 3rd 
from 4th generations and test this hypothesis.  (2) A second possibility is that those 3rd 
generation descendents of Hispanic immigrants who have the highest earnings have 
higher rates of exogamy and are less likely to self-identify as Hispanic than those with 
lower earnings.  Duncan and Trejo (2005) find evidence of this pattern for Mexican 
Americans, the largest Hispanic subpopulation. 
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 Borjas’s (1994) analysis of variations in earnings and level education by national origin reveals 
exceptions to this simplified typology; Cubans, for example, have much higher earnings and education 
levels than Mexicans and Central Americans, while some Asian nationalities have low earnings and 
education on average.  However, the differences among the dominant sending nations are consistent with 
the analytic simplification of a Hispanic / non-Hispanic typology to measure overall nativity impacts on 
mean household earnings.  
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Beyond the usual retirement age of 65, people in first-generation Hispanic 
foreign-born households achieve near parity in mean earnings with their native-born non-
Hispanic peers.  This could be the result of relatively higher rates of labor force 
participation by Hispanics than non-Hispanics.  In any event, it is not important for our 
purposes because of the small share of post-retirement-age total income that is comprised 
of earnings.  The gaps in total income between Hispanic households in different 
generations and the entire 65 and over population are similar to those in earnings between 
the same population strata under before age 65. 
A final caveat about these measures of convergence or assimilation across 
immigrant generations must be noted.  In cross-sectional comparisons, members of the 
second generation in any age group are not the offspring of the first generation in the 
same age group, but of the first generation 20 or 30 years older and who were at the same 
age 20-30 years earlier.  Actual historical progress between generations may differ from 
the proxy measure used here. 
Much larger gaps in mean asset income, of up to 80 %, are seen between foreign 
and native-born Hispanic households and non-Hispanic peers (Figure 2).  For mean 
owner-occupied home value, which is at best a crude measure of wealth because it is 
gross of any mortgage debt, the gaps are in the range of 40 to 60 % (Figure 3).  
Due to the high fertility rates of both 1st generation and native-born Hispanics, 
average household sizes of households (number of persons) in which the householder is 
Hispanic are substantially larger than non-Hispanic households of comparable age.  For 
example, the average number of persons in households with a 1st generation Hispanic 
householder age under 45 is 3.87, which exceeds by more than a third the 2.87 persons in 
households with Hispanic householders of the same age but native-born and in the 3rd or 
higher generation.  See Figure 4.  Therefore, when mean earnings, asset income, and 
house value are measured on a household basis rather than per person within the 
household, the gaps between means for the population in Hispanic households and non-
Hispanic households and between 1st and 2nd generation and 3rd –plus generation 
households are lower than those reported above by more than a third.  The gap between 
the population in 1st generation Hispanic foreign-born households where the householder 
has been in the U.S. for 10 or more years and all households age under 45 is 44 % when 
measured per capita and 25 % measured per household and at age 45 to 64 is 47 % when 
measured per capita and 30 % measured per household.  See Table 5.   The choice of 
measures does not, however, alter the relative differences between generations for 
Hispanic households. 
We conclude from this analysis that there are large gaps between the earnings of 
Hispanic households and those of the total population at similar ages as used in the PET 
model simulations.  These gaps are greatest for the first generation, decline substantially 
in the 2nd generation, and further in the 3rd–plus generation; below age 65 they vary little 
across age groups and above age 65 the gaps in mean total income are similar to those in 
earnings at younger ages.  Due to the larger average size of Hispanic households, the 
gaps in mean earnings for households are substantially smaller than the gaps in means for 
persons.  (Table 6.)   It can be inferred that the unmeasured gaps between Hispanics in 
different generations and the population mean in average consumption and associated 
carbon emissions are of similar size.  The gaps for immigrants of other ethnicities are 
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found to be negligible.  Therefore, the impact of immigration on long-term per capita 
emissions can be inferred from the differences between the Hispanic and total population.  
The size of the impacts that depends on 
1. Whether the gaps in earnings for Hispanic generations can be assumed to be 
constant over time; 
2. The projected share of the total population that will be in Hispanic households, by 
immigrant generation; and 
3. Whether the gaps in earnings on a person or household basis are applicable. 
 
These issues are taken up in the following sections of this report. 
Gaps and Intergenerational Gains in Per Capita Hispanic 
Earnings 
Whether the cross-sectional differences in the earnings across immigrant generations are 
a reliable indicator of future differences has been a subject of many scholarly inquiries 
and much debate.  These studies have attempted to deal with a forest of empirical 
complexities created by the diversity of immigrants and their children’s paths of 
assimilation in earnings and skills.  Further complexities arise from the dynamic nature 
and variations in the speed of the process of adaptation (Borjas 1994).  Much sound 
empirical work on immigrant adaptation has of necessity focused on narrow segments of 
the immigrant population in specific periods.   
For purposes of estimating future impacts, however, we are concerned not with 
the variations, complexities, and differences but with the central tendencies of immigrant 
adaptation that might reasonably be expected to persist over the very long term of 50 to 
100 years.  The competing theories in the scholarly literature about immigrant adaptation 
have radically different implications for the long-term future of immigrants and their 
descendents, and no scholarly consensus has emerged.  Therefore, our estimates will 
incorporate a range of assumptions about future gaps in earnings and consumption for the 
descendents of Hispanic immigrants corresponding to the range of impacts implied by the 
major theories.  This range is used only for later generations, because the differences are 
much larger for these generations and the combined size of these generations is much 
larger than the 1st generation under even the highest immigration assumptions. 
1st Generation Gaps 
The gaps we have measured in earnings between Hispanic households in the 1st 
immigrant generation and all households are in large part the result of gaps in earnings 
per worker, which have been extensively studied by labor economists.  Borjas (1994) 
parses the cross-sectional gaps into those of newly arrived migrants, many of whom 
arrive with a deficit in labor force skills or “quality,” and those of earlier migrants, who 
have acquired skills, e.g. English language, and attained relatively higher earnings.  In 
this formulation, the size of the mean wage or earning gap for the 1st generation is then 
the net result of (1) the labor force quality or efficiency of new immigrants, (2) their rate 
 9 
of acquiring U.S. labor-market skills and higher earnings, and (3) the numbers of 
immigrants at different stages of adaptation.  An additional factor in the calculation is 
differences in wage rates according to skill level. 
Borjas (1995) and others find that the gaps in earnings and skills for new 
immigrants increased from 1970 to 1990.  However, 90 percent of the increased gap for 
all new immigrants could be attributed to changes in the national origin of immigrants, 
especially relative increases in inflows from Mexico and other Latin American nations 
(Borjas 1992).   However, Borjas and Friedberg (2006) report a reversal of the aggregate 
trend in the late 1990s.  Using more recent data through 2002, Smith (2006) also finds 
that the trend toward wider gaps for new immigrants has recently reversed.   
Studies of the rate of convergence of immigrant cohort earnings to national norms 
have focused on differences by national origin (Duleep and Regets 1997) and 
measurement issues, most notably the effect of selective emigration of immigrants with 
lower skills and earnings (Borjas 1994).   Using a panel of Social Security records 
matched to the SIPP and CPS, Lubotsky (2000) finds that selective emigration causes 
overestimation of “both the rate of earnings growth among immigrants who remain in the 
U.S. and the secular decline in the level of earnings across arrival cohorts.”  Relatively 
little research has been done on temporal variations either in the rate of wage gains or 
selective emigration, and the attention of labor economists has recently shifted to the 2nd 
generation children of immigrants and the impacts of immigration on the wages of 
native-born workers (Card 2005). 
For our purposes, however, what matters is the is the combined, cumulative effect 
of changes in the (1) endowments of new immigrants, their (2) advancement and (3) 
emigration after arrival, (4) skill wage rates, and the (5) relative population of recent and 
long settled immigrants on the gap in mean per capita earnings for Hispanic households 
before retirement age relative to all households.  The size of the gap as measured by data 
from the Census increased moderately between 1980 and 2000, possibly reflecting the 
trends in earnings per worker reported by Borjas (1994).  However, more recent annual 
CPS data show no widening and some narrowing, possibly reflecting the reduced per 
worker gaps reported by Smith (2006).8 
Since there is no theory supporting or empirical evidence for a sustained trend in 
the gap in mean per capita earnings for 1st generation Hispanic households, our estimates 
are based on the assumption that this gap will remain at the present level as measured in 
the 2002-05 CPS. 
Gaps in the 2nd and Later Generations 
Research on long-term economic assimilation of immigrants has necessarily referred to 
the progress of the children and grandchildren of the “first wave” of immigrants, those 
who arrived 1880-1920, as a benchmark for assessing the early progress of the children 
of the “second wave” of immigrants, those who arrived since 1965 (the Hart-Celler Act).  
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 Large differences between contemporaneous 2000 Census and CPS measures of the gap are apparently a 
result of differences in the instruments and methods in the two surveys. 
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Many of these studies have measured literacy and educational attainment rather than 
earnings or income, because of a dearth of comparable data on earnings rather than any 
theoretical consideration.  There are no readily available data on the earnings and income 
of the old (first wave) 1st generation immigrants, and most of the 2nd generation children 
of the new immigrants are still so young that their level of formal education is a better 
indicator of their earnings potential than is current earnings.   
By this measure, there is consensus though not unanimity in the field that the 
descendents of the first-wave European immigrants largely closed the originally large 
gaps in educational attainment by the third or fourth generation (Alba et.al. 2001).   
However, there are substantial disagreements about whether it is valid to compare the 
economic situation of today’s first and young second generations with that of first and 
young second generation European populations 75 years ago (Perlman and Waldinger 
1997).   If immigrants are more disadvantaged today relative to native populations than 
they were early last century because of labor market conditions, fewer manufacturing 
jobs, or racial discrimination, then the prospects for substantial future reductions in 
earnings gaps by the third generation might be considered more remote than if the initial 
disadvantages faced by immigrants today are comparable to earlier ones.   
Card (2005) concludes from his study of the recent educational progress of 
immigrants’ children (to 2000) that most of the “U.S.-born children [of immigrants] will 
catch up with the children of natives.”   Smith (2006) analyzes the generational progress 
of different race groups from the Census of 1940 forward (including immigrant cohorts 
born as long ago as the 1860s) and concludes that generational progress of Latinos in 
education has not lagged substantially behind other immigrant groups.   
By contrast, based on a detailed longitudinal analysis of high school completion 
by the cohort of children in high school in 1994-95 Perreira et al. (2006) conclude that 
the children of immigrants “make significant gains in educational attainment relative to 
their parents” but that these gains stall and are even slightly reversed in the third 
generation.  This finding suggests that the descendents of Hispanic immigrants will close 
the gaps in education and, presumably, earnings with the descendents of native-born 
Hispanics, but not with those of native-born non-Hispanics, i.e., the segmented 
assimilation hypothesis (Rumbaut 1997). 
Borjas (1994) also finds slow convergence among the descendents of the first 
wave: “the ethnic differentials introduced…may linger, to some extent…until some 100 
years, or four generations, have elapsed since the migration took place.”  This study 
relates to ours more directly than most because the initial observations of gaps include 
constructed estimates of wages in 1910 and because the length of time considered is 
comparable to the length of our projections. 
Citing lagging Mexican assimilation differences between Mexican and earlier 
immigration, Huntington (2004) argues that the current gaps could endure even further 
into the future. 
The range of scholarly opinion about the future assimilation of the recent 
immigrants is aptly summarized by Alba et. al. (2001): 
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This remains an unsettled, profoundly important question.  On the one hand, the 
legal and institutional impediments that most severely obstructed non-European 
immigrants’ entry into the socioeconomic mainstream in the earlier period have 
been largely dismantled.  On the other hand, many scholars see new impediments 
that may lead to “segmented assimilation” for those non-European groups with 
low levels of human capital and other disadvantages, such as high rates of 
undocumented status (Portes and Zhou 1993).  This cardinal uncertainty, 
however, is resolved neither by our results nor by those of Borjas (1994); 
resolution must await analyses of the new arrivals’ U.S.-born generations. 
 
In view of this inherent uncertainty, we develop two estimates that are intended to 
span the range of foreseeable gaps in mean per capita earnings of 2nd and higher 
generation Hispanic households, one based on the assumption that their earnings will 
converge to the mean for the entire population (a rapid assimilation scenario), and the 
other based on the assumption that the earnings gap remains at the current (2002-05 CPS) 
level for 1st generation Hispanic households for all their descendents (an impeded 
assimilation scenario). 
Projections of Population by Ethnicity, Nativity, and Immigrant 
Generation 
Although the foreign stock and foreign-born populations are not broken out in the Jiang-
O’Neill projections (Jiang and O’Neill, submitted) used in the Dalton et al. aging and 
emissions study, other recent projections of the U.S. population (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census 2000; Edmonston and Passel 1992; Suro and Passel 2003) do identify these 
subpopulations and can be used to set bounds on the foreign stock and foreign-born 
shares implied in the Jiang-O’Neill series.  These shares in turn provide a basis for 
inferring the approximate size of populations subject to the possible labor supply effects 
in the assimilation scenarios outlined above. 
The three J-O projections of population and households (small/old, medium, and 
large/young scenarios) closely parallel total population in the corresponding Census 2000 
low, middle, and high series, despite the different launch years9.  See Figure 5.  However, 
Hispanics are a larger share of the total population in the J-O projections than in the 
corresponding Census 2000 series, and substantially so after 2050.  See Figure 6.  This is 
in part due to higher projected levels of Hispanic immigration in the J-O Small-Old and 
Medium series than in the corresponding Census 2000 projections and much higher levels 
of non-Hispanic immigration in the Census 2000 High projection than in the 
corresponding J-O Large-Young series.10  See Figure 7. 
                                                 
9
 The launch year of the 2000 Census series is 1999, with base populations estimated on the basis of the 
1990 Census.  The launch year of the J-O series is 2000, with base populations from the census of that year. 
10
 The Census Bureau’s projections of the origins of immigrants is based on “projected growth of the 
working-age component of the population of various world regions to the year 2050” and reflect 
“considerably more rapid population growth through the early part of the next century for countries of 
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Irrespective of the level of future Hispanic immigration, the projected foreign-
born share of total Hispanic population declines steadily from the early years of the 21st 
century through 2100 in all three Census 2000 projection series; from 36% in 2000 to a 
range of 14 to 25 % at mid-century and 6 to 12% at the end of the century.  The decline 
begins from 2000 in the low and medium series and starts after 2010 in the high series.  
Although the Census 2000 enumerated level of 40% is significantly above the 
projection’s launch level of 36%11, and the projected levels in the early years of the 
century are therefore on the low side, the projection of medium and long-term (2050 and 
2100) declines should still be valid.  See Figure 8.   The same long-term trend is seen in 
Edmonston and Passel’s 1992 projections (Figure 9), which fall between the Census 2000 
low and medium series in both total and Hispanic population in the medium and long 
term. 
Disregarding the Census low series, in which the assumed levels of future 
Hispanic immigration are well below the lowest of the J-O assumptions, we can infer 
from the Census Bureau 2000 results that the J-O projections imply a foreign-born share 
of the Hispanic population in the range of 20-25% in 2050, declining to 9-12% in 2100, 
with the higher figure applicable to the Large-Young scenario and the lower end of the 
range to the Small-Old scenario.  Although the Census Bureau 2000 estimates for 2000 
are 4 to 5% below the actual fraction in Census 200012, no adjustment is made to this 
estimate so that it is consistent with the projections. The Edmonston-Passel projections 
show a slower decline, from 30% in 2050 to 23% in 2090.  These ranges of the 1st 
generation Hispanic population can be used to estimate the impacts of immigration under 
the rapid assimilation scenario. 
For the impeded assimilation scenario, we need to know not only the number of 
1st generation Hispanics, but the number of 2nd generation plus the future number who are 
descendents of these cohorts, i.e. in the 3rd and higher generations.  The Edmondston-
Passel projections are of some help in this regard, showing the combined 1st and 2nd 
generations in 2010 rising from 72% of all Hispanics in 2010 to 83% in the combined 1st, 
2nd, and 3rd generations by 2050.  They use a maximal definition of foreign stock, i.e., 
children are second-generation if either parent is foreign born and third-generation if any 
grandparent is foreign born.  To do this they model intermarriage among immigrant 
generations.  However, the usefulness of the Edmonston-Passel projections is limited by 
the fact they are obsolete, dating from the early 1990s, and that the long-term mix of 
generations in 2090 appears inconsistent with those in the Census Bureau’s 2000 
projections:  The total Hispanic population in 2090, 106 million, is closest to the low 
                                                                                                                                                 
South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, than for countries of the Western Hemisphere 
including Mexico, which have seen considerable declines in fertility in recent years.” 
11
 The estimate for 2000 launch year is derived from the 1990 Census.  In 2004 the Census Bureau issued a 
revised projection series that is based Census 2000 populations but otherwise uses the same assumptions as 
the Census Bureau 2000 middle series, however the later projections are of limited use for our purposes 
since they do not break out the foreign born population. 
12
 40.2%, according to SF4. 
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Census Bureau projection of 87 million, yet the 1st generation (foreign-born) 23% is 
almost twice that in the highest Census Bureau projection, 14%.13 14 
Current data allow us to project lower bounds on the fraction of Hispanics who 
will not be assimilated in the impeded assimilation scenario, that is those who are either 
descended from today’s 1st and 2nd generations or from future new immigrants.   
• The fraction of Hispanics currently in the 1st and 2nd generations is 74.2% (CPS 
2004-2006).  
• The fraction of all births to Hispanic mothers that are 2nd generation, with a 
foreign-born mother or father (husband), is 62.7% and the fraction with at least 
one foreign-born parent or grandparent is 80.8% (Current Population Survey June 
2004).   
• The fraction of future Hispanic births to the descendents of current or future 1st 
and 2nd generations will increase as long as immigration continues. 
 
Therefore the fraction of all such potentially unassimilated native-born Hispanics 
in 2100 will be at least 81% (the current fraction of Hispanic births), since most of the 
earlier cohorts with lower fractions will have died.  Adding in the projected numbers of 
foreign-born Hispanics in the different Census Bureau 2000 series gives a range of a total 
of between 81.8% and 83.0% potentially unassimilated Hispanics in the low and high 
series respectively in 2100.  The actual fraction will be higher, because the fraction of 
native-born Hispanics who are potentially unassimilated will increase above 81% in each 
cohort born after 2005.15 16  
Note that this result is generally consistent with that of Edmonston and Passel.   
The results of the projections of the Hispanic population when estimates of 
immigrant generation are added to the Census Bureau 2000 projections are shown in 
Table 9.  The Hispanic and foreign-born Hispanic populations are directly from the 
Census Bureau projections.  The share of the native-born Hispanic population in the 2nd 
generation in 2000 is from the March 2002 Current Population Survey; the share of the 
native-born Hispanic population in 2100 that is descended from or in this and later 
immigration cohorts is assumed to be 85%, as derived above; and the corresponding 
share in 2050 is derived by linear interpolation between these two levels.   
The bottom panel of Table 9 is calculated from the top three panels and shows the 
fraction of the total Hispanic population that belongs to or is descended from either the 
current (2000) 2nd generation or later immigrant generations.  This population potentially 
affected by impeded assimilation ranges between 85.6% and 86.7% of the 2100 Hispanic 
                                                 
13
 These results might imply either Hispanic birth rates are substantially lower in Edmonston-Passel or that 
Hispanic emigration rates are substantially higher than those in any of the Census Bureau series. 
14
 The more recent, updated version of these projections by Suro and Passel (2002) give less generational 
detail and go forward only to 2020. 
15
 By applying the same logic, we estimate the minimum fraction of Hispanic women of child-bearing age, 
15 to 44, in cohorts potentially subject to impeded assimilation in 2050 at over 83% in 2050 in the low 
Census Bureau 2000 series, compared with 77.2% in 2004-6. 
16
 Also, as noted above, the launch-year estimate of the 1st generation is 4% to 5% below the current 
observed level.   
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population in the different series.  The narrow range is due to the dominance of native-
born descendents of immigrants in all three series.17  If assimilation is rapid, the affected 
population is just the first, foreign-born, generation, which ranges between 5.6% and 
11.6% of the 2100 Hispanic population in the different series. 
Population or Household Base 
As we found in Section 1(c), above, the gap between the mean earnings of first-
generation Hispanic households under age 65 and all households of similar age is 30% 
and that the gap is substantially larger, 47%, when measured on a per capita basis, due to 
the larger average size of Hispanic households.  This difference raises the question of 
which measure to use in projecting the impacts of immigration on future average earnings 
and consumption.   
The answer depends in part on whether or not the average projected immigration 
effects in the Census Bureau series are to be used to modify the earnings and 
consumption in the PET model analysis (Dalton et al. 2006) based on the corresponding 
Jiang-O’Neill series.  Since the PET model uses households as the unit of analyis, and the 
Jiang-O’Neill series already incorporate large variations in average family and household 
size by assumption (e.g., high marriage paired with high fertility and high immigration), 
the smaller, per household, gaps should for the sake of consistency be used to estimate 
how immigration effects might modify the results of the PET model simulations.  Since 
the Census Bureau projection series also pair low immigration and low fertility on the 
one hand and high net immigration and high fertility on the other hand, the same logic 
would argue for using the per household gaps.  However, the larger, per capita, gaps may 
be of interest for analytic purposes, and we therefore calculate total immigration effects 
on earnings and consumption using both measures. 
A somewhat related issue arises because of the difference between the Hispanic 
population as projected here, and the population in Hispanic households (with a Hispanic 
householder), the measure called for by the methodology of the Dalton, O’Neill, 
Prskawetz, Jiang, and Pitkin paper.  According to the 2000 Census18 the Hispanic 
population in households does exceed the population in households with Hispanic 
householders, but by just 3.5%.  We assume that this difference will remain negligible in 
the future and do not factor it into our calculations of immigration effects. 
Projected Effects on Average Per Capita Earnings  
The projected impacts of immigration on average earnings per household in 2050 and 
2100 along with comparable estimates for 2000 are shown in Table 10.   
In the rapid assimilation scenario, average per capita earnings are actually reduced 
below present levels in all series, irrespective of whether the gap is measured on a 
                                                 
17
 The range would be only slightly greater if the fractions of native-born descended from current or future 
immigrants were projected separately for each series rather than derived from the current level and by the 
same upper-bound assumption for all three series. 
18
 Summary files 1 and 2. 
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household or person basis.  This results from the declining share of immigrants in the 
population from its current historically high level. 
The impacts on average earnings are much larger in the impeded assimilation 
scenario projections, between -8.2% and -9.2% in 2100, when the per-household gap is 
used, and between -12.6% and -14.2%, when the larger per capita gap in earnings is used.  
These narrow ranges occur despite an almost 10:1 variation in net immigration of 
Hispanics between the high and low Census Bureau 2000 series at the end of the century.  
In all series the gaps in 2050 are intermediate between 2000 and those in 2100. 
Since the impact of immigration on average per capita earnings in 2000 is 
estimated to be between -1.3% and -3.1%, depending on assimilation assumption and the 
base of the gap, the projected increases in the size of the gap are correspondingly smaller 
than the projections for 2050 and 2100, with the largest increases still less than an 
incremental impact of -12%. 
Conclusions 
This report has documented the differences in average labor earnings between 
immigrants and the total population.  Considerable variations in earnings among 
immigrants of different origins are found.  The earnings of most non-Hispanic 
immigrants appear to converge to near or above the levels of their native-born peers, 
while the earnings of Hispanic immigrants and many of their descendents remain below 
population-wide age-group averages.  The impacts of immigration on earnings, 
consumption, and carbon emissions are therefore occur entirely in the Hispanic 
population. 
If per capita differences in earnings between Hispanic immigrants and the 
population mean remain near current levels, the aggregate effects on earnings and 
consumption not otherwise incorporated in the PET model estimates are found to be 
affected more by the rate of the immigrant population’s assimilation to average 
population levels of earnings than by projected differences in future immigration.  If 
assimilation is rapid, the impacts of immigration are proportional to the size of the first 
generation and will be negligible, regardless of the level of immigration or the basis for 
measuring differences in consumption.  If assimilation of the descendents of immigrants 
is impeded, the marginal impacts will be more substantial but still well below 10% in 
2100 when calculated using the preferred per household measure of earning differences.  
Only when the impacts are calculated using the larger per capita measure of differences 
in earnings and the assumption of impeded assimilation do the marginal impacts exceed 
10% by 2100. 
In view of the fact that the earnings gap in the impeded assimilation scenario 
implies a complete halt and even a slight reversal of past earnings assimilation by second 
and later generation Hispanic immigrants, the latter estimates can considered to be an 
upper bound of immigration effects on average per capita earnings and carbon emissions 
associated with household consumption in the next century. 
Further, it should be noted that these impacts on average per capita earnings and 
emissions tend to counteract the scale effects of immigration because they are in a 
 16 
downward direction.  These effects lower the carbon emissions reported in the Dalton, 
O’Neill, Prskawetz, Jiang, and Pitkin paper, and our rough estimates indicate that they 
are unlikely to be large.  The proportional differences are similar in different population 
scenarios. 
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Tables and Figures. 
Table 1. Total consumption expenditures, savings, income, government and other transfers
             by different age of householder, total and Hispanic householders, per capita 2004
 Source: BLS CES 2004
All CUs
Mean 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75-84 85+
Consumption 15,572 12,490 13,683 13,741 17,158 19,761 17,570 16,600 14,378
Savings 2,351 394 821 2,864 2,830 4,231 2,314 1,955 269
Labor income 18,769 11,354 17,785 19,518 24,807 23,925 9,936 4,688 2,824
Capital income 2,695 241 1,007 1,277 2,243 5,557 6,741 8,203 6,364
Capital 47,855 225 11,164 26,158 50,910 93,704 109,334 126,894 118,070
Gov. transfers 221 -627 -1,073 -1,075 -1,155 200 6,262 8,217 8,726
HH transfers 244 576 156 197 141 507 246 190 287
Hispanic CUs
Mean 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75-84 85+
Consumption 10,219 8,709 9,896 9,644 11,986 11,221 10,615 12,991 8,688
Savings 880 -1,065 429 1,325 759 1,839 2,725 -747 4,241
Labor income 12,052 9,355 11,154 12,196 15,797 14,112 8,583 2,794 2,774
Capital income 752 149 378 214 1,775 1,905 1,779 2,632 609
Capital 16,847 2,468 5,200 12,548 27,391 36,809 55,968 63,159 55,510
Gov. transfers -215 -503 -682 -591 -619 444 3,493 5,471 6,644
Other transfers 32 102 23 17 -60 57 400 -47 0
Percent Difference, Hispanic - All CUs
Mean 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75-84 85+
Consumption -34% -30% -28% -30% -30% -43% -40% -22% -40%
Savings -63% -370% -48% -54% -73% -57% 18% -138% 1474%
Labor income -36% -18% -37% -38% -36% -41% -14% -40% -2%
Capital income -72% -38% -62% -83% -21% -66% -74% -68% -90%
Capital -65% 999% -53% -52% -46% -61% -49% -50% -53%
Gov. transfers -197% -20% -36% -45% -46% 122% -44% -33% -24%
Other transfers -87% -82% -85% -91% -143% -89% 63% -125% -100%
Age of Householder
Age of Householder
Age of Householder
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Table 2.  Per Capita Earnings, Asset Income, Household Size, and Home Ownership 2004 CES and March 2003-2005 CPS Means Compared
Household size 
     (persons)
Age of 
Householder CES CPS CES CPS CES CPS CES CPS Census 2000 CES Census 2000
Hispanic <45 3.63 3.62 11,356$   11,530$   48$          121$        41.7% 39.2% 38.2% 20,176$     28,670$         
45-64 3.06 3.05 15,175$   15,243$   123$        347$        64.9% 61.9% 59.2% 45,433$     37,602$         
>=65 2.11 2.06 6,524$     5,852$     279$        653$        64.9% 66.6% 62.7% 63,454$     48,181$         
White, <45 2.68 2.88 20,893$   21,641$   210$        495$        58.5% 63.6% 60.5% 44,377$     46,497$         
not Hispanic 45-64 2.33 2.38 27,225$   27,739$   737$        1,601$     84.7% 83.8% 82.2% 80,614$     69,281$         
>=65 1.64 1.64 7,360$     6,478$     2,012$     3,082$     83.1% 83.1% 80.4% 94,994$     79,848$         
Black, <45 2.95 2.86 12,119$   12,724$   57$          165$        37.3% 35.7% 34.3% 18,164$     30,262$         
not Hispanic 45-64 2.46 2.37 16,064$   16,732$   56$          467$        60.0% 60.6% 58.8% 32,401$     37,406$         
>=65 2.01 1.82 5,426$     5,246$     328$        604$        65.9% 68.1% 65.1% 43,673$     39,448$         
Asian, or Pac.Islander <45 2.88 3.00 22,161$   23,017$   192$        427$        50.9% 48.9% 42.0% 59,175$     62,419$         
not Hispanic 45-64 3.04 3.09 25,277$   23,887$   339$        948$        72.9% 73.2% 69.3% 97,063$     73,116$         
>=65 2.00 2.13 8,418$     9,012$     1,358$     2,638$     67.5% 66.1% 61.9% 102,412$   98,489$         
Total <45 3.78 18,654$   379$        55.3% 53.5% 43,543$         
45-64 3.20 25,023$   1,313$     78.9% 77.4% 63,903$         
>=65 2.12 6,391$     2,674$     80.5% 78.1% 75,023$         
* Interest, dividends, and rents.
Difference CPS - CES Difference Census - CES
Hispanic <45
45-64
>=65
White, <45
not Hispanic 45-64
>=65
Black, <45
not Hispanic 45-64
>=65
Asian, or Pac.Islander <45
not Hispanic 45-64
>=65
Earnings 
per person
Asset income*
per person
House value, owners
per person
Home ownership
per household
0.4%
-2.2%
-0.3% 42.1%
-17.2%
-24.1%
1.0%
3.4%
2.1%
-3.9%
8.7%
-1.1%
0.0%
-4.4%
-0.5%
-2.3%
7.5%
-0.2%
-3.1%
-3.5%
3.9%
1.8%
-9.8%
6.1%
1.5%
0.5%
-10.3%
3.6%
1.9%
-12.0%
5.0%
4.2%
-3.3%
3.9%
-5.5%
7.0% 94.3%
180.1%
122.0%
84.0%
736.2%
189.5%
53.2%
117.4%
136.0%
133.9%
183.5%
150.7% -6.1%
-4.6%
2.6%
4.8%
-14.1%
-15.9%
66.6%
-3.8%
15.4%
-9.7%
5.5%
-24.7%
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Table 3.  Population and Earnings by Ethnicity, Nativity and Immigrant Generation
 Mean of 2003-2005 Current Population Survey, March Annual Demographic Supplement
Households Population Population
 by Householder Characteristics  by Person Characteristics
Hispanics
    Number
 (thousands)  (thousands)  (thousands)
Foreign Born 6,875               24,371             17,016          
Native born Both parents foreign born 1,278               3,998               8,902            
Mother foreign born, father native born 357                  1,041               1,539            
Father foreign born, mother native born 496                  1,436               2,410            
Both parents native born 2,733               8,023               10,367          
Total 11,739             38,869             40,234          
   Mean Persons Per Household
 (persons)
Foreign Born 3.5
Native born Both parents foreign born 3.1
Mother foreign born, father native born 2.9
Father foreign born, mother native born 2.9
Both parents native born 2.9
Total 3.3
Non-Hispanics
    Number
 (thousands)  (thousands)  (thousands)
Foreign Born 8,065               22,445             17,875          
Native born Both parents foreign born 3,219               6,474               9,557            
Mother foreign born, father native born 1,780               4,262               4,736            
Father foreign born, mother native born 2,102               4,456               4,794            
Both parents native born 85,250             208,168           207,478        
Total 100,417           245,805           244,440        
   Mean Persons Per Household  (persons)
Foreign Born 2.8
Native born Both parents foreign born 2.0
Mother foreign born, father native born 2.4
Father foreign born, mother native born 2.1
Both parents native born 2.4
Total 2.4
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Table 4.  Mean Per Capita Earnings, Asset Income, Home Ownership, and House Value, by Nativity-Generation, Ethnicity and Age of Householder
      Souce: Current Population Survey, March, 2003-2005 Average
Hispanic householder Non-Hispanic householder All householders
Age of householder:
Under 45 45 to 64 65 or older Under 45 45 to 64 65 or older Under 45 45 to 64 65 or older
Earnings Per Person
Foreign born 10,142$       12,922$       6,231$         21,262$       23,327$       8,431$         14,696$       18,821$       7,699$         
  Foreign born 10+ years in US 10,502$      13,146$      6,122$        22,407$       24,072$       8,098$         15,551$       19,423$       7,500$         
Native born, 2nd generation 13,893$       17,940$       5,063$         24,421$       29,737$       6,366$         19,679$       27,005$       6,252$         
Native born, 3rd+ generation 13,958$       19,781$       5,652$         19,873$       26,207$       6,251$         19,596$       26,011$       6,240$         
All 11,530$       15,243$       5,852$         20,223$       26,114$       6,426$         18,654$       25,023$       6,391$         
Asset income*
Foreign born 88$              248$            506$            388$            949$            2,383$         211$            646$            1,759$         
  Foreign born 10+ years in US 108$           265$           544$           482$            1,044$         2,458$         266$            713$            1,879$         
Native born, 2nd generation 206$            652$            1,108$         611$            2,315$         3,542$         428$            1,930$         3,328$         
Native born, 3rd+ generation 154$            441$            594$            432$            1,421$         2,710$         419$            1,391$         2,670$         
All 121$            347$            653$            436$            1,421$         2,805$         379$            1,313$         2,674$         
Home ownership
Foreign born 39.3% 58.9% 60.5% 54.2% 74.3% 71.5% 45.4% 67.6% 67.9%
  Foreign born 10+ years in US 48.8% 62.3% 62.7% 66.0% 78.7% 77.4% 56.1% 71.7% 73.0%
Native born, 2nd generation 48.8% 76.3% 83.8% 66.9% 87.5% 85.4% 58.7% 84.9% 85.3%
Native born, 3rd+ generation 49.5% 76.7% 86.3% 65.6% 85.1% 85.9% 64.8% 84.8% 85.9%
All 42.9% 65.5% 71.4% 64.5% 84.2% 84.8% 60.6% 82.3% 84.0%
House value **
Foreign born 24,521$       33,427$       47,770$       58,945$       75,996$       99,821$       41,228$       60,822$       86,517$       
  Foreign born 10+ years in US 24,887$      33,876$      48,074$      58,918$       77,898$       100,723$     40,603$       61,813$       87,235$       
Native born, 2nd+ generation 34,422$       42,847$       48,486$       44,402$       65,148$       74,821$       43,874$       64,310$       74,079$       
All 28,670$       37,602$       48,180$       45,393$       66,030$       76,301$       43,543$       63,903$       75,023$       
House value per capita***
Foreign born 9,631$         19,698$       28,923$       31,969$       56,470$       71,389$       18,718$       41,144$       58,718$       
  Foreign born 10+ years in US 12,139$      21,111$      30,151$      38,873$       61,293$       77,969$       22,767$       44,333$       63,652$       
Native born, 2nd generation 16,792$       32,678$       40,642$       29,692$       57,018$       63,918$       25,764$       54,609$       63,179$       
Native born, 3rd+ generation 17,035$       32,865$       41,844$       29,110$       55,438$       64,290$       28,434$       54,560$       63,657$       
All 12,299$       24,632$       34,385$       29,291$       55,614$       64,705$       26,398$       52,621$       63,007$       
* dividend, interest and rent income.
** from Census 2000, persons in owner households only
*** All households, 2000.
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Table 5.  Mean Per Household Earnings, Asset Income, Home Ownership, and House Value, by Nativity-Generation, Ethnicity and Age of Householder
      Souce: Current Population Survey, March, 2003-2005 Average
Hispanic householder Non-Hispanic householder All householders
Age of householder:
Under 45 45 to 64 65 or older Under 45 45 to 64 65 or older Under 45 45 to 64 65 or older
Earnings Per Household
Foreign born 39,232$        42,334$        13,071$        64,404$        69,056$        15,183$        51,054$        58,143$        14,550$        
  Foreign born 10+ years in US 42,025$       43,068$       12,974$       72,337$       71,127$       15,297$       55,514$       59,491$       14,601$       
Native born, 2nd generation 45,855$        50,262$        10,044$        67,279$        70,814$        10,244$        58,574$        66,623$        10,229$        
Native born, 3rd+ generation 45,053$        53,197$        11,477$        57,150$        61,949$        10,452$        56,643$        61,713$        10,468$        
All 41,758$        46,450$        12,038$        58,319$        62,912$        10,741$        55,848$        61,578$        10,806$        
Asset income*
Foreign born 339$             812$             1,062$          1,177$          2,804$          4,294$          733$             1,990$          3,325$          
  Foreign born 10+ years in US 436$            860$            1,090$         1,441$         3,042$         4,481$         883$            2,137$         3,466$         
Native born, 2nd generation 679$             1,826$          2,197$          1,683$          5,513$          5,699$          1,275$          4,761$          5,446$          
Native born, 3rd+ generation 498$             1,185$          1,205$          1,242$          3,357$          4,531$          1,211$          3,299$          4,480$          
All 439$             1,059$          1,344$          1,258$          3,422$          4,688$          1,136$          3,230$          4,521$          
Home ownership
Foreign born 35.2% 54.4% 54.6% 46.5% 70.8% 67.7% 40.5% 64.1% 63.8%
  Foreign born 10+ years in US 44.0% 56.7% 55.7% 59.4% 75.1% 70.4% 50.9% 67.5% 66.0%
Native born, 2nd generation 44.6% 72.8% 80.9% 58.5% 83.8% 81.6% 52.9% 81.6% 81.6%
Native born, 3rd+ generation 45.3% 72.3% 81.6% 59.3% 81.0% 82.4% 58.7% 80.7% 82.4%
All 39.2% 61.9% 66.6% 58.1% 80.4% 81.3% 55.3% 78.9% 80.5%
House value, owner households**
Foreign born 118,172$      140,534$      130,269$      218,830$      242,168$      197,702$      173,574$      212,115$      184,242$      
  Foreign born 10+ years in US 121,417$     141,913$     130,729$     222,169$     245,439$     198,114$     174,424$     214,156$     184,675$     
Native born, 2nd+ generation 125,901$      131,827$      113,236$      143,688$      164,392$      134,907$      142,849$      163,382$      134,432$      
All
House value, all households (2000)***
Foreign born 41,562$        76,471$        71,089$        101,699$      171,427$      133,917$      70,261$        135,970$      117,531$      
  Foreign born 10+ years in US 53,468$       80,492$       72,800$       132,078$     184,256$     139,480$     88,774$       144,471$     121,879$     
Native born, 2nd generation 56,153$        95,912$        91,637$        84,059$        137,831$      110,118$      75,500$        133,290$      109,663$      
Native born, 3rd+ generation 56,994$        95,255$        92,421$        85,205$        133,125$      111,140$      83,868$        131,923$      110,733$      
All
* dividend, interest and rent income.
** from Census 2000, persons in owner households only
*** All households, 2000.
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Table 6 .  Mean Per Person Earnings in Hispanic Households Under Age 65 
By Nativity and Immigrant Generation Relative to All Households of Same Age
      Souce: Current Population Survey, March, 2003-2005 Average
Shortfall in Earnings Per Person
Nativity and Generation
  of Householder
Foreign born 47.0% 30.5%
Native born, 2nd generation 26.9% 18.1%
Native born, 3rd+ generation 23.1% 16.5%
Mean of 
Persons
Mean of 
Households
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Table 7:  Projections of U.S. Population and Households, Total and Hispanic
Total Population Hispanic Population Hispanic Population
   (millions)   (share of total population)
2000 2010 2050 2090 2100 2000 2010 2050 2090 2100 2000 2010 2050 2090 2100
Jiang and O'Neill
low series 281.4 303.7 328.5 269.9 250.5
middle series 281.4 307.8 414.5 538.3 573.0
high series 281.4 316.6 546.3 970.4 1117.0
Census 2000
low series 274.9 291.4 313.5 291.7 282.7 32.3 40.8 69.6 87.3 88.6 11.8% 14.0% 22.2% 29.9% 31.3%
middle series 275.3 299.9 403.7 533.6 571.0 32.5 43.7 98.2 170.5 190.3 11.8% 14.6% 24.3% 32.0% 33.3%
high series 275.8 310.9 552.8 1017.3 1182.4 32.7 47.6 147.0 342.7 412.6 11.8% 15.3% 26.6% 33.7% 34.9%
Census 2004
Total 282.1 308.9 419.9 35.6 47.8 102.6 12.6% 15.5% 24.4%
Edmonston and Passell 1992
Total 299.4 369.4 431.9 38.6 72.4 106.1 12.9% 19.6% 24.6%
Jiang and O'Neill Total Households Hispanic Households Hispanic Share of Total Households
low series 105.2 121.2 165.6 180.8 181.6 9.2 13.7 33.4 55.2 60.5 8.8% 11.3% 20.2% 30.5% 33.3%
middle series 105.2 121.0 166.6 214.9 230.9 9.2 13.8 36.8 74.6 87.6 8.8% 11.4% 22.1% 34.7% 37.9%
high series 105.2 120.3 171.8 278.9 320.3 9.2 13.9 41.3 105.1 131.2 8.8% 11.5% 24.1% 37.7% 41.0%
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Table 8 :
 Projections of U.S. Hispanic Foreign Born and Foreign Stock Population
Foreign Born or Foreign Stock Hispanic Population Foreign Born or Foreign Stock Hispanic Population Foreign-Born Share of Hispanic Population
   Share of Total Population
2000 2010 2050 2090 2100 2000 2010 2050 2090 2100 2000 2010 2050 2090 2100
Census 2000, Foreign Born
low series 11.4 12.6 10.1 5.5 4.9 4.1% 4.3% 3.2% 1.9% 1.7% 35.2% 30.9% 14.5% 6.3% 5.6%
middle series 11.5 14.6 19.6 18.3 17.7 4.2% 4.9% 4.9% 3.4% 3.1% 35.5% 33.5% 20.0% 10.7% 9.3%
high series 11.7 17.5 37.3 47.0 47.7 4.2% 5.6% 6.8% 4.6% 4.0% 35.9% 36.7% 25.4% 13.7% 11.6%
Edmonston and Passell 1992
Total Foreign Stock 32.6 59.7 77.4 10.9% 16.2% 17.9% 84.5% 82.5% 73.0%
Foreign Born 15.1 21.8 24.2 5.0% 5.9% 5.6% 39.1% 30.1% 22.8%
2nd generation 12.6 23.8 29.8 4.2% 6.4% 6.9% 32.6% 32.9% 28.1%
3rd generation 4.9 14.1 23.4 1.6% 3.8% 5.4% 12.7% 19.5% 22.1%
4+ generation 6.0 12.7 28.7 2.0% 3.4% 6.6% 15.5% 17.5% 27.0%
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Table 9.  Projections of Hispanic Population by Immigrant Generation, 2050 and 2100
2000 2050 2100
Population shares
Hispanic Populationa Low 11.8% 22.2% 31.3%
  share of total population Middle 11.8% 24.3% 33.3%
High 11.8% 26.6% 34.9%
Foreign-Born Hispanic Populationa Low 35.2% 14.5% 5.6%
  share of Hispanic population Middle 35.5% 20.0% 9.3%
High 35.9% 25.4% 11.6%
All 53.2% 69.1% 85.0%
  share of native-born Hispanic population
Low 34.5% 59.1% 80.3%
Middle 34.3% 55.3% 77.1%
  share of Hispanic population High 34.1% 51.6% 75.2%
Low 69.7% 73.6% 85.8%
Middle 69.8% 75.3% 86.4%
  share of Hispanic population High 70.0% 76.9% 86.7%
a. United States Bureau of the Census 2000 projections.
Table 10.  Projections of Impacts of Immigration on Average Earnings, 2050 and 2100
Impacts on average earnings with current per household gap = -30.5% c,d
Rapid assimilation scenario Low -1.3% -1.0% -0.5%
   impact on total consumption relative to baseline Middle -1.3% -1.5% -0.9%
High -1.3% -2.1% -1.2%
Impeded assimilation scenario Low -2.0% -5.0% -8.2%
   impact on total consumption relative to baseline Middle -2.0% -5.6% -8.8%
High -2.0% -6.2% -9.2%
Impacts on average earnings with current per capita gap = -47.0%  c
Rapid assimilation scenario Low -1.9% -1.5% -0.8%
   impact on total consumption relative to baseline Middle -2.0% -2.3% -1.5%
High -2.0% -3.2% -1.9%
Impeded assimilation scenario Low -3.0% -7.7% -12.6%
   impact on total consumption relative to baseline Middle -3.1% -8.6% -13.5%
High -3.1% -9.6% -14.2%
d. Populations from Table 9.
c. Gap estimated from Current population survey data on household income, March 2003-2005, average for households 
under age 65.  See text and Tables 4 and 5.
Projection 
Series
b. Sources: 2000 from Current Population Survey (March 2002); 2100 see text; 2050 interpolated between 2000 and 2100
Members and descendents of current 2nd and descendents 
of later immigrant generations
Members and descendents of current 2nd and members 
and descendents of later immigrant generations
Members and descendents of current 2nd and descendents 
of later immigrant generations b
 
 27 
Figure 1
Per Capita Earnings, Householder Age Under 45, CPS March 
2003-2005
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Figure 2
Per Capita Asset Income, Householder Age Under 45, 
CPS March 2003-2005
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Figure 3
Per Capita Home Value, Householder Age Under 45, 
Census 2000
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Figure 4
Household Size, Householder Age Under 45, 
CPS March 2003-2005
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Total Projected Population 
Jiang-O'Neill and Census
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
20
00
20
10
20
20
20
30
20
40
20
50
20
60
20
70
20
80
20
90
21
00
Year
Po
pu
la
tio
n
J-O Large
J-O Medium
J-O Small
CB High
CB Medium
CB Low
Figure 5.
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Net Projected Immigration, Non-Hispanic
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Foreign-Born Share of Hispanic Population, 
Census 2000 Projections
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Foreign-Stock Share of Hispanic Population, 
Edmonston-Passel Projections
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